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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by respondents for foreclosure 
of a mortgage instituted and tried in 1961 and re-
opened in 1965 for determination of respondents' 
right to attorney's fees. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After the trial in December, 1961 judgment of 
"no cause for action" was rendered against re-
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spondents. Five years later the lower court heard 
evidence on the issue of attorney's fees pursuant to 
a nunc pro tune order and rendered judgment for 
respondents for attorney's fees in the amount of 
$3,500.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal of the lower court's 
Judgment of September 26, 1966 awarding $3,500.00 
attorney's fees to respondents and their attorneys. 
Appellants also seek a reversal of the lower 
court's Order Nunc Pro Tune of October 19, 1966 
amending the minute entry of December 15, 1961, 
to reserve the issue of attorney's fees for trial. 
Appellants further seek a reversal of the lower 
court's Order of October 19, 1966 denying appel-
lants' Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and for 
a New Trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 15, 1954 Lake Hills, a Utah nonprofit 
corporation, executed a note and mortgage to re-
spondents in the amount of $142,200.00 providing 
for payments of $15,800.00 each April 15th there-
after. (R. 4-6.) As of the same date an escrow ar-
rangement was agreed to by the parties under which 
a warranty deed from appellant Lake Hills to re-
spondents was deposited with Walker Bank & Trust 
Company. Under the terms of the escrow Lake Hills 
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was to make annual payments of $15,800.00 on each 
April 15th thereafter until $142,200.00 plus interest 
was paid. The escrow instruction provided that if 
Lake Hills failed to pay any of the installments when 
due, "or within thirty days thereafter," then Walker 
Bank should deliver the warranty deed to respond-
ents, upon their demand. ( R. 68-69.) 
All payments of the annual installments from 
April 15, 1955 through April 15, 1960 were made 
to the escrow agent and disbursed by it to respond-
ents. (R. 69.) No payments were ever made directly 
to respondents under the note and mortgage and 
no objection or demand was ever made by respond-
ents to this procedure. 
On April 20, 1961 respondents commenced this 
action against Lake Hills to foreclose the mortgage 
of April 15, 1954, alleging default of the April 15, 
1961 installment and nonpayment of taxes on the 
mortgaged premises for the years 1955 through 
1960. (R. 1-3.) 
The installment due April 15, 1961 was paid 
to the escrow agent on May 12, 1961 under the terms 
of the escrow allowing a thirty-day grace period. 
( R. 69.) Disbursement by the escrow agent was 
apparently refused by respondents since the escrow 
agent held this installment until after the trial. 
The answer of Lake Hills to respondents' com-
plaint alleged payment of the 1961 installment and 
abatement of the taxes that were allegedly unpaid. 
(R. 12.) 
The case went to trial on December 7, 1961 
before Judge Marcellus K. Snow. It was shown that 
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the 1961 installment had been paid within the grace 
period provided in the escrow agreement, that the 
taxes for 1955, 1956 and 1957 had been abated by 
Salt Lake County, and that the taxes for 1958, 1959 
and 1960 had been paid by Lake Hills under protest. 
( R. 70.) The case was taken under advisement by 
the court and judgment rendered on December 15, 
1961 as shown by the minute entry in the Register 
of Actions of that date, which reads as follows: 
The above entitled case having been taken 
under advisement. 
Whereupon the Court having considered 
and now being fully advised in the premises, 
finds that upon receipt by the Plaintiff of the 
check in the amount of Fifteen Thousand 
Eight Hundred Dollars ($15,800.00) now 
held in trust, the Court orders judgment en-
tered in favor of the Defendants and each of 
them as "no cause for action". The Court fur-
ther orders said check be delivered within 
thirty (30) days. (R. 48) 
The installment paid to the escrow agent on May 
12, 1961 and held in trust by it pending trial was 
disbursed to respondents on January 3, 1962. (R. 
70.) 
It appears that no formal findings of fact, con-
clusions of law or judgment were ever signed or en-
tered in the case because of failure of the parties to 
agree to findings in accordance with the court's de-
cision of December 15, 1961. ( R. 100. ) Some pro-
posals for findings were subrni tted by the parties 
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but because no agreement could be reached, the mat-
ter was dropped. 
No further action in the case was taken until 
April of 1966. Both parties relied on the decision 
of December 15, 1961 as reflected in the minute en-
try. This is shown by the fact that the installments 
due in each of the following years were paid by Lake 
Hills, or its successors L. N. Johnson and Johnson 
Enterprises, Inc., to the escrow agent and were dis-
bursed to and accepted by respondents without ob-
jection or claim that any more was due. (R. 71-72.) 
On September 10, 1964 appellants Lester N. 
Johnson and Johnson Enterprises, Inc. became suc-
cessors in interest to appellant Lake Hills pursuant 
to an Arrangement under Chapter XI of the Federal 
Bankruptcy Act. The 1964 and 1965 installments 
due under the note, mortgage and escrow arrange-
ment were paid to the escrow agent and disbursed 
to respondents. (R. 71-72.) 
The final installment under the note, mortgage 
and escrow arrangement was due April 15, 1966. 
However, on April 12, 1966 an Amended and Sup-
plemental Complaint was filed by respondents set-
ting out issues that had been settled in the trial of 
December 7, 1961, claiming that $5,000.00 attorney's 
fees should be awarded, and seeking to enjoin the 
escrow agent from accepting the final installment 
payment. ( R. 50-52.) This was the first action taken 
01· notice given by respondents claiming any right 
to attorney's fees since the trial of 1961. 
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Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties 
appellants paid $5,000.00 into court pending the 
outcome of this new claim, and the note and mort-
gage were paid in full. ( R. 53-55, 73.) 
On September 23, 1966 the matter of attorney's 
fees in this foreclosure action was heard by District 
Judge A. H. Ellett, a different Judge than the one 
that originally heard the case. Judgment was rend-
ered from the bench against appellants in the amount 
of $3,500.00. (R. 126.) Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law and Judgment were signed and entered 
Septmeber 26, 1966 (R. 75-78) and a Motion to 
Amend Findings of Fact and for a New Trial was 
filed on September 29, 1966. (R. 79-81.) This mo-
tion was heard and denied by the court on October 
4, 1966. ( R. 84-85.) 
Then it appears that counsel for respondents 
decided that the judgment for attorney's fees en-
tered September 26, 1966 might not be valid because 
it was contrary to the judgment rendered in Decem-
ber of 1961 of "no cause for action". Therefore an 
Order Nunc Pro Tune was prepared and presented 
to Judge Snow, who originally heard the case, and 
on ex pa rte motion of counsel for respondents the 
order was signed and entered on October 19, 1966 
amending nunc pro tune the minute entry of Decem-
ber 15, 1961 to reserve the issue of attorney's fees 
for trial. ( R. 82-83.) 
On or about November 2, 1966 respondents re-
ceived $3,500.00 from the clerk of the court in satis-
faction of the amount awarded to them. Thereafter 
this appeal was taken. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS HA VE NO RIGHT TO AT-
TORNEY'S FEES FROM APPELLANTS WHEN 
THEY HA VE NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
THEM. THE COURT'S ORIGINAL RULING OF 
"NO CAUSE FOR ACTION" WAS CONCLUSIVE 
ON THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
WAS PROPERLY MADE BECAUSE THE AC-
TION WAS PREMATURE. 
This is a highly unusual case in which, after 
all the issues had been settled in a trial, the case 
was reopened nearly five years later at the instance 
of the losing parties to determine their right to attor-
ney's fees. Overlooking the original five-year-old 
decision the court, in the person of a different judge, 
made only a determination of the reasonableness of 
the attorney's fee it awarded without making a de-
termination of a right to that fee. It will be shown 
that the court's original decision was conclusive on 
this issue and that the court's later consideration 
and determination of the case was not only irregu-
lar but reversible error. 
After the trial on the merits of this case in De-
cember, 1961, the court rendered judgment against 
respondents of "no cause for action". Respondents 
do not dispute this ruling of the court yet they claim 
a right to attorney's fees under that cause of action. 
Attorney's fees are not taxable against either party 
to an action unless provided by statute or by con-
tract. And, even if so provided, they are not taxable 
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unless the party seeking them prevails in the case. 
If he has no right of action, why should he be en-
titled to attorney's fees for pursuing a right he does 
not have? 
It has already been stated that respondents do 
not dispute the court's ruling of "no cause for ac-
tion". However, it is apparent from the record that 
this ruling of the court was correct and supported 
by the evidence. Respondents' suit for foreclosure 
was based upon nonpayment of the 1961 installment 
and of the taxes for 6 years. Neither of these claims 
was valid. 
The parties entered into two separate arrange-
ments to insure payment of the $142,200.00 debt due 
from Lake Hills to respondents. First, a note and 
mortgage were executed and delivered. Second, an 
escrow agreement was signed providing a thirty-
day grace period for the annual installments. It is 
indisputable that all payments made on the debt 
prior to the commencement of this action were made 
through the escrow agent and it was expected that 
all future payments would be made in the same 
way. Otherwise, the escrow agent, not having re-
ceived an annual installment, could have delivered 
the deed to the mortgaged premises to respondents 
even though the annual installment had been paid 
directly to respondents. This, of course, was not 
the intent of the parties. Therefore, having intended 
that all payments were to be made to the escrow 
agent under the terms of the escrow agreement, the 
parties cannot dispute the applicability of the thirty-
day grace period in the escrow agreement. Any pay-
9 
ment of the 1961 installment to the escrow agent 
within thirty days of April 15, 1961 would be in 
compliance with the agreement of the parties. Any 
action to foreclose the mortgage instituted before 
the expiration date of that grace period would be 
premature. The 1961 installment was received by 
the escrow agent on May 12, 1961, which was with-
in the grace period. This action was commenced on 
April 20, 1961 and therefore the action was not 
only premature but was bound to fail on the merits 
because there was no default in the payments. This 
was the position of the court in ruling that there 
was "no cause for action". This was apparently also 
the opinion of the court at the later hearing of 
September 23, 1966. The court then expressed its 
opinion, on page 125 of the record, that receipt of 
the 1961 installment "would do away with this cause 
of action". 
The second alleged ground for institution of the 
foreclosure action by respondents was the nonpay-
ment of taxes on the mortgaged premises. It is clear 
from the record that there was no obligation to pay 
the taxes for 1955, 1956 and 1957 because they had 
been abated by Salt Lake County on June 25, 1958, 
long before this action was commenced. It is difficult 
to see why respondents assert the nonpayment of 
taxes for these years as grounds for foreclosure, es-
pecially after the court ruled against them in De-
cember, 1961. The abatement of these taxes removed 
the lien for these taxes from the mortgaged premises 
and vitiated any obligation of any party to pay the 
taxes. It is also clear from the record that proceed-
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ings were underway for abatement of the taxes for 
1958, 1959 and 1960, and that eventually these taxes 
were paid by Lake Hills under protest. These abate-
ment proceedings precluded the nonpayment of the 
taxes from being grounds for foreclosure and the 
payment of the taxes under protest further justified 
the court's ruling of "no cause for action". 
Moreover, the claim of failure to pay the taxes, 
even if true, does not give rise to a cause of action 
for foreclosure of the mortgage. This is a matter of 
contract and unless clearly provided in the mortgage, 
there may be no foreclosure for failure to pay taxes. 
59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 496, at 800-01 (1949); 37 
AM. JUR. Mortgages§ 535, at 35-36 (1941). The 
mortgage in this case specifically provides that it 
may be foreclosed for failure of the mortgagor to 
pay the taxes only if the taxes are "paid by the Mort-
gagees or their assigns". (R.6.) No claim is made 
that respondents ever paid the taxes on behalf of the 
mortgagor and it is clear that they did not. The re-
fore there was no cause of action to foreclose the 
mortgage on this ground either. Yet Judge Ellett, 
who heard the petition for attorney's fees on Septem-
ber 23, 1966, granted the petition solely because he 
thought the mortgage could be foreclosed for failure 
to pay the taxes. ( R. 126.) As already in di ca ted he 
considered the other ground of default in the annual 
installment to be invalid. ( R. 125.) Judge Ellet had 
probably not read the terms of the mortgage, since 
the information on which he based his decision was 
given to him orally while on the bench ( R. 98, 104) , 
and therefore he was not aware that the mortgage 
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did not allow foreclosure unless respondents had 
paid the taxes themselves. 
Respondents' claim of default in the annual 
installment was decided against them, and properly 
so, by both Judge Snow and Judge Ellett. Respond-
ents' claim of failure to pay the taxes was decided 
against them by Judge Snow. While this claim was 
apparently the basis for Judge Ellett's decision in 
favor of respondents, it does not support his decision 
and the merits of it were hardly considered by him. 
Moreover, there are no findings of fact made by 
Judge Ellett to support his judgment for attorney's 
fees. His judgment should therefore be reversed. 
Judge Snow's decision of "no cause for action" was 
a decision that respondents had no right to fore-
close the mortgage. How can respondents lose on the 
merits and still obtain a judgment for attorney's 
fees? 
Furthermore, since the right to attorney's fees 
in a foreclosure action is a matter of contract, no 
right to attorney's fees exists unless specifically pro-
vided for in the mortgage. 59 C.J .S. Mortgages§ 
812a., at 1545 ( 1949). Respondents' claim for attor-
ney's fees must be based on the provision in the 
mortgage stating that the mortgagor agrees to pay 
a reasonable attorney's fee "in the event of foreclos-
ure." ( R. 6.) The term "foreclosure" means "a ter-
mination of all rights of the mortgagor or of his 
grantee in the property covered by the mortgage . 
. . . It denotes, not the beginning, but the end, of 
a procedure adopted by the mortgagee to bar per-
petually the rights of the mortgagor, and includes 
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the sale itself of the mortgaged property, rather 
than the steps preliminary to the sale." 59 C.J.S. 
Mortgages§ 482, at 761 (1949); Anderson v. Barr, 
-------- Col. ________ , 62 P.2d 1242, 1246, ( 1936). The 
commencement of an action to foreclose a mortgage 
is not foreclosure, especially when the court finds, 
as it did here, that there was no right to foreclosure. 
Since there was no "event of foreclosure," this pro-
vision of the mortgage has not come into effect and 
there is no basis for a claim to attorney's fees. 
It does not help respondents' case to claim that 
they are entitled to attorney's fees because they were 
required to bring the action to enforce payment of 
taxes or the annual installment by Lake Hills. Their 
action was premature until after the grace period 
expired or until they had paid the taxes on behalf 
of Lake Hills. Having no right to bring the action, 
respondents have no right to penalize appellants by 
recovering attorney's fees from them for bringing 
the action. 
In the later proceedings in this case no attempt 
was made by respondents to change the court's ruling 
of "no cause for action." Under the circumstances 
they had no basis upon which to have this ruling 
changed and to proceed with foreclosure. They ac-
quiesce in this ruling of the court and yet insist on 
a right to attorney's fees. "No cause for action" 
means no cause for any action including one for at-
torney's fees. The court's original decision is con-
clusive on all issues and the reopening of the case 
itself, as well as the award of attorney's fees, by the 
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lower court constitutes error for which it should be 
reversed. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTS WERE G U I L T Y OF 
LACHES IN FAILING TO ASSERT THEIR 
CLAIM FOR FOUR-AND-ONE-HALF YEARS 
AFTER JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED AND 
SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING IT 
NOW BECAUSE OF THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF 
LATER INSTALLMENTS ON THE MORTGAGE. 
This action was commenced in April of 1961 
and tried in December of 1961. The trial court ren-
dered a judgment of "no cause for action". If this 
judgment had been followed by written findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and by a written judg-
ment, there would be no question that respondents' 
claim for attorney's fees would have been cut off. 
In this case the only evidence of the court's original 
judgment is the minute entry in the Register of 
Actions. This minute entry is sufficiently detailed 
to determine the rights of the parties and should 
be considered conclusive. If the minute entry judg-
ment of "no cause for action" is not considered con-
clusive, then appellants are unfairly deprived of a 
written judgment to that effect in this case. The 
only reason no written findings or judgment were 
signed is because the parties could not agree on 
findings of fact. The duty to make findings and 
conclusions rests on the court. UTAH R. C1v. P. 52(a). 
In this case the court did not make findings and con-
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clusions but suggested that the parties agree be-
tween themselves on findings and conclusions for 
it to sign ( R. 106). To require the parties to agree 
on findings when they are in court because they 
disagree seems somewhat ludicrous. Here the parties 
could not agree and therefore the court failed in its 
duty to make findings and conclusions. This should 
not deprive the prevailing party of his right to an 
effective and final judgment. The court made its 
decision. The decision is clear and should be con-
clusive. 
Notwithstanding this failure to enter a written 
judgment, it is contended by appellants that respond-
ents are barred by laches and estoppel from asserting 
any claim they might have had for attorney's fees. 
This contention is based on ( 1) respondents' long 
delay in asserting this claim, ( 2) their acceptance 
of subsequent installments under the note and mort-
gage, and ( 3) the prejudice resulting to the appell-
ants Lester N. Johnson and Johnson Enterprises, 
Inc. 
At the trial in December, 1961, respondents 
made no claim for attorney's fees and offered no evi-
dence to support such a claim. ( R. 122.) This in 
itself was a waiver of any right to attorney's fees 
since it is necessary in the courts of this state that 
an award of attorney's fees be based on evidence 
presented at the trial. Utah Savings & Loan Ass'n 
v. Nunley, 17 Utah 2d 348, 411 P.2d 838 ( 1966); 
F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 
80, 404 P.2d 670 ( 1965). Respondents did not there-
after assert their claim for attorney's fees until 
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April 12, 1966, when they filed their Amended and 
Supplemental Complaint. It is true that they were 
claiming a right to attorney's fees in their proposed 
Findings of Fact dated January 15, 1963, but no 
action was taken until four-and-one-half years after 
the trial. This long delay should be construed as an 
implied waiver of any right to attorney's fees, if it 
had not already been waived at the trial. The case 
was terminated and if a right to attorney's fees 
existed, it was an immediate right to be claimed for 
services of respondents' attorneys to that point. The 
failure to claim that right immediately gave all 
parties reason to think that it would not be claimed. 
Since the mortgage was not foreclosed, the in-
stallments for the following years were still to be 
paid. Each of the installments for the years 1962-
1965 were received and accepted by respondents. 
No claim or demand that any additional amounts 
were due was made during any of these years. Ap-
pellants were led to believe that, if any right to attor-
ney's fees ever eixsted, it had been waived. It was 
not until the final installment was due in 1966 that 
respondents asserted a claim for attorney's fees. 
This they did by reviving an action that everyone 
had long thought dead. Acceptance of all the inter-
vening installments without complaint was acquies-
cence in the ruling of "no cause for action" and indi-
cates a waiver of any supposed right to attorney's 
fees. 
Appellants Lester N. Johnson and Johnson En-
terprises, Inc. are successors in interest to the 
original mortgagor. In 1964 they took over the re-
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maining obligation under the mortgage relying on 
the fact that all installments up until that time had 
been paid and that their obligation under the mort-
gage would be limited to the future installments. 
They had no knowledge of a claim for attorney's 
fees. Respondents and their attorneys participated in 
the federal court proceedings in which Johnson and 
Johnson Enterprises took over the mortgage. They 
made no claim or demand in those proceedings or 
directly to Johnson for attorney's fees that might 
be due under the mortgage. This would have been 
the proper time to do so and yet all parties concerned 
were apparently relying on the original ruling of 
"no cause for action" in the foreclosure proceeding. 
Lester N. Johnson and Johnson Enterprises ac-
cepted the obligation of the future installments 
under the mortgage without any knowledge of a 
claim for attorney's fees. Such knowledge may have 
induced them to take a different course of action. 
They changed their position in reliance upon the 
facts as they existed at that time, or as they were 
presented to them. This later claim to attorney's fees 
from appellants results in prejudice to them because 
they had changed their position and the failure of 
respondents to assert their claim before appellants' 
change of position should bar them from asserting 
their claim afterwards. 
It makes little difference whether this conten-
tion is based on waiver, estoppel or laches. All three 
are variations of the same thing and the basis of all 
three appears in this case. Waiver is usually defined 
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as the voluntary relinquishment of a known right 
and may be implied from a party's course of con-
duct which evidences an intention to waive his rights. 
BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY, at 1752 (4th ed. 1951). 
Estoppel precludes one from asserting a claim 
because his own actions, or silence when there is a 
duty to speak, have led another to change his posi-
tion. Laches has been termed delay for such a time 
as to constitute acquiescence, Mary Jane Stevens Co. 
v. First Nat'l Bldg. Co., 89 Utah 456, 57 P.2d 1099, 
1125 ( 1936), or "delay that works a disadvantage 
to another." Mawhinney v. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 
232 P.2d 769, 773 (1961). 
Waiver does not require the party asserting it 
to change his position to his prejudice. Therefore, 
respondents' failure to assert their claim at the trial 
or off er evidence to support their claim, their failure 
to assert their claim during the federal court pro-
ceedings, their delay of four-and-one-half years be-
fore finally asserting their claim, and their accept-
ance of all installments under the mortgage is a 
course of conduct evidencing an intention to waive 
their claim. This establishes implied waiver. Adding 
to this course of conduct the fact that appellants have 
changed their position to their prejudice because of 
respondents' silence when they had a duty to speak, 
also establishes grounds for estoppel. Their delay 
for four-and-one-half years has worked a disadvan-
tage to appellants and is sufficiently long to consti-
tute acquiescence. They are therefore also guilty 
of laches. 
18 
POINT III 
THE ENTRY OF THE NUNC PRO TUNC 
ORDER AFTER FIVE YEARS OF DELAY 
WITHOUT A SHOWING OF CLERICAL ERROR 
AND UPON EX PARTE APPLICATION BY RE-
SPONDENTS WAS IRREGULAR, INVALID 
AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE 
COURT. 
Realizing that the court's original ruling of "no 
cause for action" probably disposed of their claim 
for attorney's fees, respondents applied to the court 
for a nunc pro tune order amending the original 
ruling to reserve the issue of attorney's fees for trial. 
The record indicates that this application was made 
ex parte without notice to appellants and that the 
order was signed without any kind of a hearing or 
showing of error in the original ruling. It is admitted 
that under certain limited circumstances a nunc 
pro tune order is proper to correct clerical errors in 
a prior order of the court. However, the change made 
by the nunc pro tune order in this case was not made 
to correct a clerical error. It made a substantial 
change in the rights of the parties, allowing respond-
ents a right to attorney's fees where none existed be-
fore. 
The purpose and limitations on the use of the 
nunc pro tune order are explained in the following 
quotation from 30A AM. JUR. Judgments § 606, at 
587-88 (1958): 
... the general rule is that a court may 
not, under the form of an amendment of its 
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records, revise or change the judgment in sub-
stance for the purposes of correcting an error 
of law contained therein, or of recording a 
judgment that was never in fact rendered, 
and of having such judgment entered nunc 
pro tune. In this connection, it has been de-
clared that the power to amend should not 
be confounded with the power to create, that 
the office of entering, and the power to enter, 
a judgment nunc pro tune are restricted to 
placing upon the record evidence of judicial 
action which has actually been taken, and that 
the correction of the record of a judgment 
by amendment and the entry of such amend-
ment nunc pro tune presuppose a judgment 
actually rendered at the proper time. Under 
this rule, the amendment or nunc pro tune 
entry may not be made to supply a judicial 
omission or an error of the court, or to show 
what the court might or should have decided, 
or intended to decide, as distinguished from 
what it actually did decide. The authority of 
the court in this connection does not extend 
beyond the power to make the journal entry 
speak the truth, and may be exercised only to 
supply omissions in the exercise of functions 
which are clerical merely. 
That the foregoing rule is also the rule in Utah 
is established by decisions of this court. In Frost v. 
District Court of First Judicial District, 96 Utah 
106, 83 P.2d 737 (1938), it was held that a nunc 
pro tune order four years after judgment correcting 
the years of priority of water rights was error. 
The changes made were "substantial and not cleri-
cal" and "the court was without power to make 
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changes other than merely clerical ones after the 
expiration of the term of court in which the judg-
ment was entered." The court at page 740 quoted 
with approval from 1 FREEMAN, JUDGEMENTS § 141 
(5th ed.) as follows: 
... the law does not authorize the cor-
rection of judicial errors, however flagrant 
and glaring they may be, under the pretense 
of correcting clerical errors. 
. . . The court cannot under the guise 
of correcting its record put upon it an order 
or judgment it never made or rendered, or 
add something to either which was not origin-
ally included although it might and should 
have so ordered or adjudged in the first in-
stance. It cannot thus repair its own lapses 
and omissions to do what it could legally and 
properly have done at the right time. A court's 
mistake in leaving out of its decision some-
thing which it ought to have put in, and some-
thing in issue of which it intended but failed 
to dispose, is a judicial error, not a mere 
clerical misprision, and cannot be corrected by 
adding to the entered judgment the omitted 
matter on the theory of making the entry con-
form to the actual judgment rendered. 
Kettner v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28 
(1962), was a case where the lower court signed a 
nunc pro tune order allowing a motion for new trial 
to be filed even though more than ten days had 
elapsed after judgment. This court granted a writ 
of prohibition, stating at page 30: 
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We are not unmindful of the fact that in 
proper circumstances where the interests of 
justice so require, the court has power to act 
nunc pro tune, that is, to do an act upon one 
date and make it effective as of a prior date. 
It is recognized that clerical errors may be 
corrected or omissions supplied so the record 
will accurately reflect that which in fact took 
place. However, this device cannot properly be 
used in the manner resorted to here to revive 
the time for taking a required step in a legal 
proceeding after the statutory time for doing 
it had elapsed .... 
It is clear from the foregoing that in order for 
the order entered in this case to be proper, the court 
must have actually reserved the issue of attorney's 
fees for later trial at the time of its decision in 1961. 
That the court might have or should have reserved 
this issue, or intended to but failed to reserve this 
issue, would not justify its order. It must have actu-
ally reserved the issue at the time. The nunc pro 
tune order would then be proper to correct the "cler-
ical" error in recording the court's decision. 
The court quite obviously did not originally re-
serve the issue of attorney's fees because it was not 
even brought before it. No evidence was offered on 
the issue ( R. 122) and therefore no ruling was made 
concerning it. It is unlikely that the court or either 
of the parties intended to reserve the issue of attor-
ney's fees for two reasons. First, when the court 
rules against one party, it will not ordinarily also 
rule that he is entitled to attorney's fees for his losing 
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effort. Nor will either of the parties expect it. Sec-
ond, in the usual case all issues will be disposed of 
at the same hearing. No reason appears why this 
should not be the case here. Both parties, as well as 
the court, would be interested in having all issues 
heard at the same time. If for some reason separate 
hearings were contemplated, the record would show 
it. At the very least a date would have been set for 
the later hearing. That respondents did not think 
that the issue of attorney's fees had been reserved 
clearly appears from the proposed findings of fact 
prepared by their attorney. (R. 41-42.) These pro-
posed findings make no mention of a reservation of 
the issue of attorney's fees. If the issue had been 
reserved, it would have been to respondents' ad-
vantage to so state. Yet paragraph 13 proposes a 
certain sum as a reasonable attorney's fee as if no 
later hearing was contemplated. 
It is only reasonable to assume that, after a 
ruling of "no cause for action," no one thought the 
issue of attorney's fees could or should be considered. 
This was clearly an afterthought of respondents. 
The record does not show that the issue was 
originally reserved and it is illogical to assume that 
it was. Therefore a nunc pro tune order is improper. 
The proper procedure to obtain a nunc pro tune order 
would have been to set a hearing before Judge Snow, 
who originally heard the case, and give notice to all 
parties concerned. Then the judge would have the 
benefit of both sides of the case and would not be 
relying on the representations of the party seeking 
the order. After a delay of five years it is unlikely 
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that the judge could remember the details of this case 
out of the hundreds that had come before him. 
Moreover, since the minute entry showed a ruling 
of "no cause for action," the nunc pro tune order 
was contrary to the record and the judge's memory 
should not be relied upon. 
Whether or not notice to the parties concerned 
is necessary before a nunc pro tune can be entered 
has been considered by various courts in the past. 
While these decisions vary according to the facts 
involved, they have been summarized in Annotation, 
14 A.L.R.2d 224 ( 1950). The author of that annota-
tion states at page 229 that the courts are not in-
clined to dispense with notice where the error to 
be corrected "is considered to be judicial or substan-
tial, or where the correction is sought to be made 
after the expiration of the term at which the orig-
inal judgment was rendered, or where the error can 
be established only by evidence outside the record . 
. . . " The author goes on to state that better prac-
tice would "require notice wherever a party would 
be in a less favorable position after the correction has 
been made than he was under the judgment as origin-
ally entered, and to dispense with notice only where 
the correction is a matter of indifference to the party 
not notified." 
In the instant case the change was not clerical 
but substantial, was made five years later, and the 
alleged error does not appear from the record but 
could only be established by evidence outside the 
record. Appellants are also in a much less favorable 
position than under the original judgment which 
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would dismiss the whole action on the merits. Notice 
should have been given to appellants and evidence 
submitted to establish the elleged error. Failure in 
both these respects constitutes error for which the 
lower court should be reversed. 
The lapse of nearly five years between the orig-
inal ruling and the nunc pro tune order is in itself 
grounds for reversing the order. While laches has 
been discussed in Point II above, the five-year delay 
in seeking the correction is separately asserted here 
as grounds for refusing the nunc pro tune order. 30A 
AM. JuR. Judgments § 600, at 584 (1958) states: 
. . . an unexcused and unexplained de-
lay in seeking the correction of a clerical error 
or misprision in the record of a judgment has, 
on the ground of laches, brought about a de-
nial of the amendment in sundry instances. 
The delay in this case was both unexcused and 
unexplained and should bar the nunc pro tune order 
on the ground of laches. In this respect this case is 
similar to the Kettner case where a nunc pro tune 
order overcoming the effect of a lapse of a statutory 
period was reversed. Here the period of time in-
volved is not statutory but is sufficiently long to 
invoke laches as grounds for reversal. 
POINT IV 
THE H E A R I N G OF RESPONDENTS' 
CLAIM BY A DIFFERENT DIVISION OF THE 
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COURT THAN THE ONE THAT ORIGINALLY 
HEARD THE CASE WAS IRREGULAR. 
As pointed out above Judge Snow presided at 
the trial of this action on December 7, 1961, and 
after taking the matter under advisement, rendered 
a judgment in favor of appellants of "no cause for 
action" on December 15, 1961. The only evidence of 
this judgment is the minute entry of that date in 
the Register of Actions. That minute entry recites 
that the payment of the annual installment, having 
been held in trust, was to be delivered to respondents. 
Judge Snow apparently recognized that the install-
ment had been paid within the grace period and 
therefore there was no right to foreclose. Point I 
of this argument shows that a ruling of "no cause 
for action" could only mean that neither of the 
grounds asserted by respondents for foreclosing the 
mortgage was valid. Yet, because the court made no 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the basis 
for Judge Snow's decision cannot be known. 
When respondents' claim for attorney's fees was 
heard five years later, almost no consideration at 
all was given to the right to foreclose the mortgage. 
This later hearing was before Judge Ellett and it 
would be understandable if one judge did not want 
to question another judge's basis for decision. Yet 
the basis of Judge Snow's original decision was im-
portant in this later hearing. If there was no right 
to foreclose, there was no right to attorney's fees. 
Difficult as it might have been for a judge to remem-
ber the basis of his decision rendered nearly five 
years earlier, only that judge would know that basis 
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in the absence of written findings. The trial of dif-
ferent issues in the same action before different 
judges is irregular, especially when all of the issues 
may have been considered and disposed of by the 
first judge. The matter of attorney's fees should have 
been brought before Judge Snow. Failure to do so 
was an irregularity for which the lower court should 
be reserved. 
POINT V 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT AWARD-
ING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RESPONDENTS 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS REQUIRED 
BY LAW. 
The lower court, in awarding attorney's fees 
to respondents, made only one finding of fact. That 
finding states that $3500.00 is a reasonable attor-
ney's fee. (R. 77.) There is no finding that appel-
lants were in default under the mortgage to justify 
the bringing of this action. There is no finding that 
the mortgage provided for attorney's fees in case 
of default. There is no finding that taxes were not 
paid on the mortgaged premises. There is no finding 
that appellants Lester M. Johnson and Johnson 
Enterprises had assumed the obligation of attorney's 
fees under the mortgage. There is no finding or 
conclusion that respondents did not waive their right 
to attorney's fees by accepting subsequent payments 
under the mortgage. There is no finding or conclu-
sion that the court had power to award attorney's 
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fees when the action had already been tried and 
determined adversely to the respondents. This lack 
of findings was objected to by appellants in their 
motion to Amend Findings of Fact and for a New 
Trial, which was denied by the court. 
It has been established as fundamental in Utah 
that any judgment must be based upon findings of 
fact which in turn must be based on the evidence. 
This is required by UTAH R. Civ. P. 52(a). It has 
also been the holding of numerous cases decided by 
this court. LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, _______ _ 
Utah 2d ________ , 420 P.2d 615 (1966); F.M.A. Finan-
cial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 
670, 673 ( 1965) ; Gaddis Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 3 
Utah 2d 43, 278 P.2d 285, 286 (1954); In re Thomp-
son's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 35, 269 Pac. 103, 109 
(1927). As these cases and others cited therein indi-
cate, failure of the court to make findings sufficient 
to support the judgment or upon all of the issues 
raised by the pleadings is reversible error. 
The single finding in this case that $3500.00 
is a reasonable attorney's fee is not sufficient to 
support a judgment for that fee without additional 
findings on all the issues raised by the pleadings. 
For the court's failure to do this, it should be re-
versed. 
POINT VI 
EVEN IF RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED 
TO AN ATTORNEY'S FEE IN THIS CASE, THE 
$3500.00 AWARDED BY THE LOWER COURT 
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IS AN UNREASONABLE AND UNCONSCION-
ABLE FEE. 
Should it be determined that respondents are 
entitled to attorney's fees in this matter, it is sub-
mitted by appellants that the amount awarded by the 
lower court is not reasonable under the circum-
stances of this case. The mortgage provides for a 
"reasonable" attorney's fee. Even if it provided for 
a set sum, the court would be obligated to determine 
if that sum were reasonable. Mason v. Mason, 108 
Utah 428, 160 P.2d 730, 733 ( 1945). As previously 
indicated the court was of the opinion that respond-
ents were entitled to a fee because of the failure to 
pay taxes. ( R. 126.) Therefore, no fee should be al-
lowed for any services rendered in connection with 
any other alleged grounds for foreclosure. Only those 
legitimate services concerning the failure to pay 
taxes should be considered. Even though this was 
not grounds for foreclosure, as appears in Point 
I above, and even though all taxes were abated or 
eventually paid, the total amount of unabated 
or unpaid taxes at the time suit was commenced, 
including interest and penalties, was $2,167.99. This 
could be the only amount for which suit could be 
brought because the mortgage does not provide for 
the acceleration of the principal upon failure to pay 
taxes. To award more attorney's fees than the 
amount for which suit is brought seems clearly un-
reasonable. If the Fee Schedule adopted by the Utah 
State Bar were followed, the recommended fee in 
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a forclosure action based on a delinquency of $2,-
167. 99 would be $47 4.80. It is therefore submitted 
that a fee of $3500.00 is unreasonable. 
Moreover, it is submitted that respondents 
would be entitled to a fee only for the services of 
their attorneys to the time of the original trial in 
this action. Testimony was taken at the hearing as 
to the amount of time spent by respondents' attor-
neys. One of those attorneys, however, testified that 
this time included the time spent after the trial in 
numerous other matters. (R. 109.) Since the taxes 
were paid before the trial, no fee should actually 
be allowed for services after such payment. If the 
principal could not be accelerated for failure to pay 
taxes, then the only possible reason for bringing suit 
would be to force payment of taxes. Once the taxes 
were paid, there would be nothing to try and no 
further services were necessary by respondents' 
attorneys. Therefore all services rendered in pre-
paring for and participating in the trial should 
be excluded. In light of this a $3500.00 attorney's 
fee is not reasonable. 
It was also testified at the hearing that a con-
siderable amount of time was spent by respondents' 
attorneys in researching and briefing issues that 
were not involved in this case. (R. 114-15.) The 
court's award was based on this time as well as all 
other time spent by respondents' attorneys. Only that 
amount of time that was legitimately spent by their 
attorneys in prosecuting this action on the grounds 
upon which they could rightfully bring this action 
and prevail, should be considered in determining the 
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amount of the fee. There was no breakdown of the 
total time spent to indicate the time legitimately and 
necessarily spent. This, together with the fact that 
only $2,167.99 was involved in the action, makes 
an award of $3500.00 unreasonable, unconscionable 
and an abuse of discretion by the court. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing arguments have shown that the 
lower court was in error in granting judgment for 
$3500.00 attorney's fees because: 
( 1) There was no right to bring this foreclos-
ure action in the first place and therefore no attor-
ney's fees should be allowed for pursumg a non-
existent right; 
(2 ) If there was initially a right to attorney's 
fees, that right has been waived or is barred by 
laches or estoppel because of the lapse of time, ac-
ceptance of later installments under the mortgage, 
and failure to claim that right when appellants were 
changing their position to their prejudice; 
(3) The proceedings for the determination of 
that right were irregular and invalid due to the lack 
of notice and evidence of clerical error and the delay 
in obtaining the nunc pro tune order and in bring-
ing the matter before a different division of the court 
than the one which originally heard the case ; 
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( 4) There are no findings of fact upon the 
essential issues raised by the pleadings or indicating 
any right to bring this foreclosure action upon which 
to base the court's judgment for attorney's fees; 
( 5) The amount of the fee under the circum-
stances of this case is unreasonable, unconscionable 
and constitutes an abuse of discretion by the court. 
For these reasons the lower court's Judgment 
of September 26, 1966, its Order Nunc Pro Tune of 
October 19, 1966, and its Order of October 19, 1966, 
denying appellants' Motion to Amend Findings of 
Fact and for a New Trial, should all be reversed with 
directions that the $3500.00 paid to respondents by 
the clerk of the court be returned to the clerk and 
disbursed to appellants. 
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